Zelensky’s War (Part I)

In late July, 2022, former US president Donald John Trump made some waves when he declared on a podcast that Ukraine could have “given up” Crimea and avoided war, and that Zelensky was stupid to not have negotiated – before insinuating that Russia incinerated hundreds of thousands, perhaps, millions of Ukrainian civilians.

While some in the online pro-Russian commentariat had a small cheer for this seeming moment of clarity, I took it as more of the same, the hopelessness of concluding any agreement with parties who don’t understand and don’t care to learn about any of the issues involved. Dragging Crimea back up as the thing that could have prevented war is so naïve a notion as to be laughed out of hand. It fundamentally fails to understand the nature of Ukrainian society and Zelensky’s own interests as its ruler.

So let’s talk about that.

V. Zelensky became famous internationally in 2019 as the comedic actor who, as the popular perception goes, ran a Cinderella campaign to unseat an entrenched oligarchy in the world’s most corrupt country. In actuality, he was a media product, groomed for years by his oligarch patron Kolomoisky through his TV show Servant of the People to be the people’s image of what a “good” leader should be. The TV Zelensky was well-meaning, a bit dopey, and above all moderate. Some people voted for Zelensky, including many in the Donbass, because of a hope for implementing the Minsk agreement.

Even now, this curated image of Zelensky colors the perception of his character, even in the pro-Russian camp. In some eyes he is alternately a ridiculous clown or just a weak leader led around by the nose by his foreign backers and nationalists. These types are forever exasperated that Zelensky isn’t “taking the L” or, in a corollary, when there isn’t Ukrainian resistance to his regime.

In reality, Zelensky is currently confident in his power. He is running a dictatorial regime where his opposition is banned and the SBU can arrest or murder anyone without repercussions. Those who looked like credible rivals at one point, like former president Poroshenko, are dancing in the palm of his hand. But observers of Ukrainian politics would have seen this in the cards.

While Zelensky won on all fronts in the 2019 election, and he made moves initially to deescalate things in the Donbass, but after the first year and the end of his honeymoon period, Zelensky found himself in a curious position. Although his Servant of the People Party held an absolute majority, he effectively had no majority because the whole party would not vote together for his laws. Increasingly stalled on the legislative front and overall not very successful on the domestic policy front, he nevertheless found a path out of the logjam through the national security infrastructure.

Zelensky and his team came to rely on the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) as a very convenient tool. Under the guise of de-oligarchization, in early 2021 he targeted Viktor Medvedchuk and a slew of his business associates, accusing them of treason and financing terrorism. In the following months the NSDC compiled more lists of traitors, both individuals and companies, with Zelensky even signing orders to deprive Ukrainian citizens of their citizenship. Many of those targeted had their assets confiscated.

The result of all this was that his popularity, which had eroded into the 20% range, retook the mid-30s, which is respectable for Ukrainian politics. It turns out that the witch hunting and persecution did him some favors with the public and restored some of his credibility. This coincided with a re-militarization and attempt to escalate once again in the Donbass. However, this was not without problems, as in the fall of 2021 his senior advisor Sergey Shefir was targeted and very nearly killed in an apparent assassination attempt. Zelensky, of course, blamed Russia.